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Lesson 46 of 47 ยท Projects and Practice

Cheat Sheet: Behavioral Economics at a Glance (Chapters 5 to 8)

A one-page recap of the formulas, experiments and cautions from time and risk, social preferences, nudges and applications, with calculators and practice problems.

This page is the whole second half of the course on one sheet. It lists the formulas you can compute, the experiments you should be able to describe, and the cautions that keep you honest. Read it before a test or before you read a new paper, and use the calculator and the practice problems to check that you can still do the arithmetic. Everything here is explained in detail in the lessons; this is a map, not a replacement.

Poster with four cards: time, risk, social, nudge
Caption: The cheat sheet in four cards: time, risk, social preferences and nudges, with the key formulas and rules.

What you will learn

  • A compact summary of formulas, findings and cautions.
  • How to check your arithmetic with a calculator.
  • Ten quick problems with worked answers.

Key terms

Formula sheet: the set of equations you should recognize and use.

Rule of thumb: a short guide that is often right but not always.

Sanity check: a quick test of whether an answer is reasonable.

Order of magnitude: the rough size of a number, such as tens, hundreds or thousands.

Time

Idea Formula or fact
Discounted utility U = ฮฃ ฮด^t ยท u(c_t)
Exponential discounting D(t) = ฮด^t; constant rate, no reversals
Hyperbolic discounting D(t) = 1 / (1 + kยทt); steep early, flat later
Beta-delta U_0 = u_0 + ฮฒ ยท ฮฃ ฮด^t ยท u_t; ฮฒ < 1 is present bias
Reversal rule Take sooner S over later L when S > ฮฒ ยท L (with ฮด = 1)
Planners Naive: expects to behave. Sophisticated: foresees lapses and buys commitment

Risk

Idea Formula or fact
Expected utility EU = ฮฃ p_i ยท u(x_i); concave u is risk averse
Certainty equivalent u(CE) = EU; risk premium = expected value โˆ’ CE
CRRA u(x) = x^(1โˆ’ฯ) / (1โˆ’ฯ), ln x at ฯ = 1
Rabin Small-stakes aversion cannot be curvature alone; points to loss aversion
Holt-Laury 4 safe choices is risk neutral; more is risk averse
Caution Risk attitudes vary with domain, stakes and method

Social preferences

Idea Formula or fact
Ultimatum Money-only: offer little, accept. Reality: offers 40โ€“50%, low offers rejected
Dictator Gifts exist but are fragile (take options, anonymity, exit)
Public goods Dilemma when m / n < 1 < m; payoff E โˆ’ c_i + (m/n)ยทฮฃc
Fehr-Schmidt U = x โˆ’ ฮฑยทmax(yโˆ’x,0) โˆ’ ฮฒยทmax(xโˆ’y,0)
Responder rule Accept if s โ‰ฅ 10ฮฑ / (1 + 2ฮฑ) (pie of 10)
Dictator rule Gives half if ฮฒ > 0.5, otherwise nothing
Other models ERC (shares), Rabin (intentions), warm glow, image concerns

Nudges

Idea Formula or fact
Definition Changes choice architecture; keeps options and incentives
Default effect 37% to 86% in a 401(k) study; effort, endorsement, reference point
Inertia model Opt-in wยทa; opt-out w + (1โˆ’w)(1โˆ’a); active choice w
EAST Easy, Attractive, Social, Timely
Sample size n โ‰ˆ (1.96 + 0.84)ยฒ ยท [p1(1โˆ’p1) + p2(1โˆ’p2)] / (p2โˆ’p1)ยฒ
Evidence 8.7 points (academic) versus 1.4 points (nudge units); publication bias
Ethics Transparent, easy to opt out, serves the chooser, fair

Markets and policy

Idea Formula or fact
Overtrading Most active households earned about 11.4% versus about 17.9% for the market
Disposition effect PGR above PLR (about 15% versus 10% in one study)
Myopic loss aversion Gain-loss ratio rises with the horizon; frequent checking feels risky
Limits to arbitrage Risk and funding constraints let mispricing persist
Megastudies Compare many interventions fairly; expect winner's curse
Critiques Welfare standard, heterogeneity, i-frame versus s-frame

Common misconceptions

"A cheat sheet replaces understanding." It only helps if you know what each line means; go back to the lesson for any line you cannot explain.

"Numbers from one study are universal." Effects depend on setting and population.

"Formulas give the facts." Formulas describe models; facts come from data.

Try it

First, a calculator with the main formulas. Pick one from the menu, fill in the numbers and read the answer.

Formula calculator

Second, ten quick problems. Try each on paper first, then run the code to see the answers and check your arithmetic.

Python Ten quick problems with answers

Press Run (or Ctrl + Enter) to see the result here.

Program input ยท what you'd type while the program runs

Type the answers before you press Run, one per line. Each time the program reads a line (with input()), it gets the next line from this box.

Check your understanding

Quick check ยท 4 questions

of 4 answered You scored / 4 ยท perfect!

  1. 1. Which formula gives the minimum acceptable offer of a Fehr-Schmidt responder with a pie of 10?

    Setting s โˆ’ ฮฑ(10 โˆ’ 2s) = 0 gives s = 10ฮฑ / (1 + 2ฮฑ).
  2. 2. With ฮฒ = 0.6 and ฮด = 1, a person compares 100 now with 150 later. What does she do?

    The later reward is worth 90 to her today, which is below 100.
  3. 3. A public goods game with n = 4 and m = 1.6 has MPCR:

    m / n = 1.6 / 4 = 0.4.
  4. 4. In the inertia model, opt-out participation is:

    Those who want to save stay enrolled, and those who do not want to save but fail to opt out also remain.

Summary

  • The cheat sheet lists the key formulas for time, risk, social preferences, nudges and markets.
  • Use the calculator to check arithmetic and the practice problems to test yourself.
  • Formulas describe models; always check the assumptions and the evidence.
  • Pair this sheet with the glossary when you revise.

Next: Further study