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Lesson 27 of 37 ยท Market Structures

Oligopoly and Game Theory

Study markets with a few interdependent firms: the prisoner's dilemma, Nash equilibrium, cartels and a worked Cournot duopoly with runnable code.

In an oligopoly, a few large firms dominate the market: airlines on a route, mobile networks, soft-drink makers, search engines. The key feature is interdependence. When one firm changes its price or output, rivals notice and respond, so each firm must think about what the others will do before it acts.

Studying that kind of decision needs game theory, the analysis of strategic choices where the outcome depends on what everyone else chooses.

The prisoner's dilemma

Two rival firms, Alpha and Beta, each pick a High price or a Low price. The payoffs are daily profits in thousands of dollars (an invented example): the first number is Alpha's, the second Beta's.

Beta: High Beta: Low
Alpha: High 10, 10 2, 15
Alpha: Low 15, 2 5, 5

Think like Alpha:

  • If Beta charges High, Alpha earns 10 by also charging High, or 15 by charging Low. Low is better.
  • If Beta charges Low, Alpha earns 2 with High, or 5 with Low. Low is better again.

Low is a dominant strategy: it is best whatever the rival does. Beta reasons the same way, so both choose Low and each earns 5. But if both had stayed High, each would have earned 10. The rational individual choices lead to a worse result for both. That is the dilemma.

A Nash equilibrium is an outcome where no player can gain by changing their own choice while the others keep theirs. (Low, Low) is the Nash equilibrium here.

Python Find Nash equilibria by brute force

Press Run (or Ctrl + Enter) to see the result here.

Program input ยท what you'd type while the program runs

Type the answers before you press Run, one per line. Each time the program reads a line (with input()), it gets the next line from this box.

Collusion and cartels

Because both firms would earn more at (High, High), they are tempted to agree on high prices. A group of firms that agrees to restrict output and fix prices is a cartel. Cartels are fragile for the reason above: each member gains by secretly cheating (selling more or discounting), and in most countries explicit price-fixing is illegal.

When firms interact repeatedly, cooperation can survive without an agreement. A firm that cuts its price today may trigger a price war tomorrow, so the short-term gain of cheating is outweighed by long-term losses. Such tacit collusion is hard to prove and regulators watch for it.

Kinked demand and price rigidity

One older model explains why oligopoly prices are often stable. If a firm raises its price, rivals do not follow, and it loses many customers (elastic demand above the current price). If it cuts its price, rivals match, and it gains little (inelastic below). The demand curve has a kink at the current price, which makes MR jump and keeps price steady even when costs change a little. The model describes stickiness but not how the price was set in the first place.

The Cournot duopoly

A duopoly has two firms. In the Cournot model they choose quantities at the same time, taking the rival's quantity as given. Let market demand be P = 100 - Q, where Q = q1 + q2, and each firm has constant marginal cost 10.

Firm 1's profit is (100 - q1 - q2 - 10) ร— q1. Maximizing, MR = 90 - 2q1 - q2 = 0, so its best response to firm 2 is

q1 = (90 - q2) / 2

By symmetry q2 = (90 - q1) / 2. The equilibrium is where both best responses hold: q1 = q2 = 30.

Then Q = 60, P = 100 - 60 = 40, and each firm earns (40 - 10) ร— 30 = 900.

Compare with the benchmarks:

Structure Total quantity Price Total profit
Perfect competition (P = MC) 90 10 0
Cournot duopoly 60 40 1,800
Monopoly (or perfect cartel) 45 55 2,025

Oligopoly outcomes lie between competition and monopoly: more firms mean lower prices.

Python Cournot best-response dynamics

Press Run (or Ctrl + Enter) to see the result here.

Program input ยท what you'd type while the program runs

Type the answers before you press Run, one per line. Each time the program reads a line (with input()), it gets the next line from this box.

The two firms' guesses converge to 30 each. Try changing a or mc to see how the equilibrium responds.

Other oligopoly strategies

  • Price leadership: one dominant firm sets the price and others follow.
  • Non-price competition: advertising, product features and loyalty schemes, which avoid price wars.
  • Barriers to entry: scale economies, brand names and patents protect existing firms.
  • Concentration measures: the four-firm concentration ratio (share of the top four firms) and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, the sum of squared market shares. Four firms with 40, 30, 20 and 10 percent shares give 1600 + 900 + 400 + 100 = 3000.

Check your understanding

Quick check ยท 4 questions

of 4 answered You scored / 4 ยท perfect!

  1. 1. The main feature of oligopoly is

    With few firms, each one's decisions affect and depend on its rivals.
  2. 2. A Nash equilibrium is an outcome where

    Each player is doing the best they can given what the others do.
  3. 3. Why are cartels unstable?

    The cartel price is above marginal cost, so each firm profits from selling a little more, the prisoner's dilemma again.
  4. 4. In the Cournot example (P = 100 - Q, MC = 10), what is each firm's output?

    The best-response condition q = (90 - q_other) / 2 with equal outputs gives q = 30.

Summary

  • Oligopoly: few firms, barriers to entry, interdependent decisions.
  • The prisoner's dilemma shows why individually rational choices can leave firms worse off.
  • A Nash equilibrium has no profitable one-sided deviation; cartels tend to break down.
  • In a Cournot duopoly, outcomes lie between competition and monopoly.
  • Concentration ratios and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index measure market concentration.

Next: Externalities and Pigouvian Taxes