Skip to content
Tutorials Center
My learning

Topics

Lesson 31 of 37 ยท Market Failure and Government

Asymmetric Information: Lemons, Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

See how markets break down when one side knows more than the other, from used cars to insurance, and which signals and rules help restore trust.

Perfectly competitive markets assume that buyers and sellers know what they are trading. Often they do not. A seller of a used car knows its history, but the buyer does not. A person buying health insurance knows their own habits better than the insurer. When one side knows more than the other, we have asymmetric information, and it can make markets shrink or disappear.

Adverse selection: the market for lemons

Imagine a used-car market with two kinds of cars:

  • Good cars: worth $12,000 to a buyer, and the owner would sell for $10,000 or more.
  • Lemons (bad cars): worth $6,000 to a buyer, and the owner would sell for $5,000 or more.

Half of the cars are good and half are lemons. Sellers know which is which; buyers cannot tell by looking.

A buyer picks a car at random. The expected value is 0.5 ร— 12,000 + 0.5 ร— 6,000 = 9,000. So buyers will pay at most about $9,000.

But owners of good cars want at least $10,000, so they refuse and withdraw their cars. Now only lemons remain. Buyers realize this and offer at most $6,000. In the extreme, the good cars disappear from the market even though both buyers and sellers of good cars would have gained from trade (between $10,000 and $12,000). This process, in which the bad products drive out the good, is adverse selection. The economist George Akerlof described it in his well-known "market for lemons" paper.

Python Lemons market: which cars stay for sale?

Press Run (or Ctrl + Enter) to see the result here.

Program input ยท what you'd type while the program runs

Type the answers before you press Run, one per line. Each time the program reads a line (with input()), it gets the next line from this box.

Real markets do not always collapse. Information problems are reduced by:

  • Warranties and return policies: a seller of a good car can offer a guarantee that a lemon seller could not afford.
  • Reputation and brands: dealers care about repeat business.
  • Third-party checks: independent inspections, vehicle history reports, certified pre-owned programs.
  • Signaling: actions that credibly reveal quality, since they are cheaper for good types than for bad types. A degree can signal ability to employers; a long warranty signals a reliable product.
  • Regulation and disclosure rules: labels, minimum standards, licensing.

Adverse selection in insurance

Insurance has the same problem. People who know they are high risk are more likely to buy it. If the insurer sets a premium for the average risk, low-risk customers find it too expensive and leave. The remaining pool is riskier, so the premium rises, driving out more healthy customers: a "death spiral". Insurers respond by screening (medical questions), pricing by risk, or governments make insurance compulsory so that the low-risk customers stay in the pool.

Python An insurance pool and the premium spiral

Press Run (or Ctrl + Enter) to see the result here.

Program input ยท what you'd type while the program runs

Type the answers before you press Run, one per line. Each time the program reads a line (with input()), it gets the next line from this box.

Moral hazard

Moral hazard is a change in behavior after a deal, because someone else bears the cost of the risk. A person with full car insurance may drive less carefully; a bank that believes it will be rescued may take bigger risks. The party who cannot observe the behavior (insurer, lender) faces higher costs.

Typical remedies:

  • Deductibles and co-payments so the insured shares some of the loss.
  • Monitoring: telematics in cars, audits, loan covenants.
  • Incentive contracts: no-claims bonuses, performance pay, bonuses tied to long-term results.

The principal-agent problem

A principal hires an agent to act for them (a shareholder and a manager, a patient and a doctor), but the agent has different goals and more information. Solutions include performance contracts, supervision and reputation. Each is imperfect, so some loss remains.

Information as a good

Information has special properties: it is costly to produce and cheap to copy, and it can be used by many people at once. That makes it close to a public good (see the earlier lesson). Governments protect it with patents and copyright to reward producers, and subsidize free information (weather forecasts, statistics, public research).

Check your understanding

Quick check ยท 4 questions

of 4 answered You scored / 4 ยท perfect!

  1. 1. Asymmetric information means

    Unequal knowledge between buyer and seller can distort the market.
  2. 2. In the lemons market, good cars leave the market because

    Buyers cannot tell quality, so they offer an average price that is too low for owners of good cars.
  3. 3. Which of these is moral hazard?

    Moral hazard is risky behavior after a contract is made, because someone else bears the cost.
  4. 4. A long warranty on a product can act as

    Only firms confident in their product's reliability can afford to offer it, so the warranty credibly signals quality.

Summary

  • Asymmetric information arises when one side knows more than the other.
  • Adverse selection (before the deal) can drive good products or low-risk customers out of the market.
  • Moral hazard (after the deal) changes behavior when someone else bears the cost.
  • Remedies: warranties, reputation, signaling, screening, deductibles, monitoring, regulation and mandatory pools.

Next: Labor Demand and Labor Supply