JavaScript Reference ยท Browser and Web APIs
Content Security Policy (CSP)
Concept page on Content Security Policy: how the header or meta tag limits scripts, styles and connections, nonces, violation events and a safe rollout.
Content Security Policy is a browser feature that limits what a page is allowed to load and run. You declare a policy, and the browser refuses anything that does not match it: a script from an unknown host, an inline <script>, an eval() call, a connection to an unexpected server. Its main job is to turn many cross-site scripting (XSS) bugs from "attacker code runs" into "browser blocks it and reports it".
CSP is a second line of defense. It does not replace escaping output and validating input; it limits the damage when something slips through.
Setting a policy
The usual way is an HTTP response header:
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'nonce-r4nd0m'; img-src 'self' data:
A policy is a list of directives separated by semicolons. Each directive names a resource type and a list of allowed sources.
| Directive | Controls |
|---|---|
default-src |
Fallback for any resource type without its own directive. |
script-src |
JavaScript sources, inline scripts, eval(). |
style-src |
Stylesheets and inline styles. |
img-src, font-src, media-src |
Images, fonts, audio and video. |
connect-src |
fetch(), XMLHttpRequest, WebSocket and EventSource targets. |
frame-src, frame-ancestors |
Which pages you may embed, and who may embed you. |
object-src |
Plugins; usually set to 'none'. |
base-uri, form-action |
Where <base> may point and where forms may post. |
Common source values: 'self' (same origin), 'none', a host such as https://cdn.example.com, a scheme such as https: or data:, 'nonce-...', 'sha256-...', and 'strict-dynamic'. The quotes around keywords are part of the syntax.
You can also use <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="..."> in the page head. It applies only to content that comes after it, and some directives (such as frame-ancestors) work only in the header.
Nonces and hashes
Inline scripts are the usual XSS payload, so a strict policy blocks them. To allow your own, the server generates a fresh random nonce for every response, puts it in the header ('nonce-abc') and in each trusted tag (<script nonce="abc">). An attacker who injects markup cannot guess it. A hash ('sha256-...') allows one specific inline script by its content.
The second script has no nonce, so the browser refuses to run it, and a violation is reported. The eval() call is blocked too, because script-src without unsafe-eval forbids evaluating strings as code.
Report-only mode and rollout
Add a policy under Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only first. The browser enforces nothing but fires violation events and, with report-to (or the older report-uri), sends reports to an endpoint you choose. Watch the reports, fix legitimate violations, then switch to enforcing.
You can also listen in the page itself, as the example does: a securitypolicyviolation event on document carries blockedURI, violatedDirective, effectiveDirective and sourceFile.
Press Run (or Ctrl + Enter) to see the console output here.
No output.
Usage notes
- Start strict, loosen consciously.
'unsafe-inline'and'unsafe-eval'cancel much of the protection; avoid them inscript-src. - Prefer nonces or hashes over host allow-lists for scripts; allow-lists tend to include hosts that can serve attacker-controlled code.
- Inline event handlers (
onclick="...") andjavascript:URLs are blocked by strict policies; useaddEventListener(). - Inline styles are governed by
style-src; many sites keep'unsafe-inline'there longer than for scripts, which is a smaller (but real) risk. - A policy can break extensions and third-party widgets. Test with the browser console open; violations are logged there.
- Multiple policies combine. When several are present, a resource must satisfy all of them.
frame-ancestorsreplaces the olderX-Frame-Optionsfor preventing clickjacking.- Trusted Types is a related, newer mechanism that guards dangerous DOM sinks such as
innerHTML; check support before relying on it.
Browser support
CSP is supported in all current browsers. Some newer features ('strict-dynamic' handling details, report-to, Trusted Types) differ by browser, so check a compatibility table.