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Lesson 27 of 37 ยท Mechanism Design and Auctions

Auction Formats and Bidding Strategies

Learn the four basic auction formats, how private values and Bayesian games work, and compute the first-price equilibrium bid with a Python Monte Carlo simulation.

Auctions sell art, spectrum licenses, oil fields, advertising slots and government bonds. They are also one of the cleanest applications of game theory: the rules are exact, the payoffs are money, and small rule changes lead to very different behavior. This chapter uses auctions as the entry point to mechanism design: choosing the rules of a game so that self-interested players produce a good outcome.

The four standard formats

For one indivisible item:

  • First-price sealed-bid. Everyone submits a secret bid. The highest bidder wins and pays their own bid.
  • Second-price sealed-bid (Vickrey). Same bids, but the winner pays the second-highest bid.
  • English (ascending). The price rises; bidders drop out; the last one in wins at the price where the second-to-last dropped.
  • Dutch (descending). A clock starts high and falls; the first bidder to accept the current price wins and pays it.

The English auction behaves like a second-price auction, and the Dutch auction like a first-price auction (the winner pays what they offered), at least under private values.

Four auctions

First price Winner pays own bid
Second price Winner pays runner-up's bid
English Price rises until one is left
Dutch Price falls until someone takes it

Same item, different incentives.

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Private values and Bayesian games

In the independent private values model, each bidder knows exactly how much the item is worth to them (their value v_i) but only knows the distribution of the others' values. Values are drawn independently, here uniformly on [0, 1]. This is a Bayesian game: each player has a private type (their value) and chooses a strategy that maps types to actions, so a bidding strategy is a function b(v).

A player's payoff if they win and pay price p is v - p, and 0 if they lose.

Equilibrium bidding in a first-price auction

In a first-price auction, bidding your true value guarantees a profit of zero, so you should shade your bid below your value. How much? Shade too little and your profit is small; shade too much and you lose often. With n bidders whose values are uniform on [0, 1], there is a symmetric equilibrium in which everybody bids

b(v) = (n - 1) / n * v

With two bidders each bids half their value. With ten bidders each bids 90 percent. More competition means less shading.

Why is this an equilibrium? Suppose the other n - 1 bidders use that rule, and you have value v and bid b. You win when everybody's value is below b * n / (n - 1), which happens with probability (b n / (n - 1)) to the power n - 1. Your expected profit is (v - b) times that probability. Setting its derivative to zero gives b = (n - 1) v / n, matching the rule.

Simulating a first-price auction

Python First-price auction: optimal shading

Press Run (or Ctrl + Enter) to see the result here.

Program input ยท what you'd type while the program runs

Type the answers before you press Run, one per line. Each time the program reads a line (with input()), it gets the next line from this box.

The profit peaks at a shade factor of 0.75, which equals (n - 1) / n for n = 4. Bids above that give away too much profit per win, and bids below it lose too many auctions.

Comparing revenue in the four formats

Now play whole auctions where all bidders follow their equilibrium strategies and compare the seller's revenue. For the second-price and English formats, bidding your value is a (weakly) dominant strategy, so we use that.

Python Seller revenue in first-price and second-price auctions

Press Run (or Ctrl + Enter) to see the result here.

Program input ยท what you'd type while the program runs

Type the answers before you press Run, one per line. Each time the program reads a line (with input()), it gets the next line from this box.

The two averages agree (about 0.667 for n = 5): the seller expects the same revenue in both formats, a result known as revenue equivalence, studied in the next lessons. Both auctions also give the item to the bidder with the highest value, so both are efficient.

Beyond private values

  • Common value. The item has one true value that everyone estimates with noise (oil rights). The winner is the person with the most optimistic estimate, so winning is bad news about your estimate: the winner's curse. Rational bidders shade their bids to compensate.
  • Affiliated values (the general model with correlated signals): English auctions then raise more revenue than sealed-bid auctions, because rivals' drop-outs reveal information.
  • Reserve prices and entry fees. A minimum price excludes low-value bidders but raises payments from the rest.
  • Collusion. Bidders can agree to bid low and divide the gains, which is much easier to sustain in some formats than in others.

Check your understanding

Quick check ยท 4 questions

of 4 answered You scored / 4 ยท perfect!

  1. 1. In a first-price sealed-bid auction with private values, how should a bidder bid compared with their value?

    Bidding your value yields zero profit, so you shade your bid to earn a positive profit when you win.
  2. 2. With n bidders and values uniform on [0, 1], what is the symmetric equilibrium bid in a first-price auction?

    More bidders mean less shading: with n = 2 you bid half, with n = 10 you bid 90 percent of your value.
  3. 3. Which format resembles a second-price auction under private values?

    In an English auction the winner pays roughly the price at which the second-highest bidder dropped out.
  4. 4. What is the winner's curse?

    In common-value auctions the winner tends to have overestimated the value, so naive bidders lose money.

Summary

  • Basic formats: first-price, second-price, English (ascending), Dutch (descending).
  • In the private-values Bayesian model, a bidding strategy maps a value to a bid.
  • In first-price auctions bidders shade: with uniform values, b(v) = (n - 1) v / n.
  • Second-price and English auctions reward truthful bidding; first-price and Dutch reward shading.
  • Common values create the winner's curse; reserves and collusion change the picture further.

Next: The Vickrey Second-Price Auction