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Lesson 6 of 36 ยท Principles and Evidence Handling

Chain of Custody

Learn what a chain of custody is, what a custody form records, how to label and seal evidence, and how a tamper-evident hash-chained log can protect your records.

Imagine a laptop seized on Monday and examined on Friday. Where was it on Tuesday? Who could have switched it on? If nobody can say, the other side can argue that the data was changed, and the evidence may be thrown out or simply not believed. The chain of custody is the documented, unbroken trail that answers those questions: it records every person who held the evidence, when, where, why, and in what condition.

What a custody record contains

For each item of evidence:

  • A unique evidence ID (for example E-001) and a plain description (make, model, serial number, capacity).
  • Where, when and by whom it was found or seized.
  • Its condition (powered on or off, damaged, seals intact) and photographs.
  • Each transfer: from whom, to whom, date and time, reason, signatures.
  • Storage location between transfers, and who had access.
  • Hashes of any images made from it (see hashing).

A typical paper form is one row per handover:

Item Date/time (UTC) Released by Received by Purpose Seal
E-001 laptop 2025-04-01 09:20 A. Rivera (scene) B. Chen (lab) Transport S-4471 intact
E-001 laptop 2025-04-01 13:00 B. Chen Locker L-3 Storage S-4471 intact
E-001 laptop 2025-04-02 08:30 Locker L-3 C. Okoye Imaging S-4471 cut, new S-4590

Every gap in a log, like a night with no entry between two rows, is a question someone can ask you.

Handling at the scene

  1. Photograph the scene, screens, cables and labels before touching anything.
  2. Label each item with its ID. Use evidence bags or tamper-evident tape with numbered seals.
  3. Use anti-static bags for drives, and Faraday bags for phones to block remote commands.
  4. Do not power on seized devices to "have a quick look". Even booting changes timestamps and files.
  5. Keep evidence in controlled storage: locked, access-logged, climate-appropriate.
flowchart LR
    S["Scene<br/>seize and label"] --> T["Transport<br/>sealed bag"]
    T --> L["Lab intake<br/>check seals, log"]
    L --> V["Secure storage"]
    V --> I["Imaging<br/>(working copies made)"]
    I --> V
    V --> C["Court / return"]

Every arrow is a transfer that gets a line in the custody log.

Original versus working copies

You work on working copies of images, never on originals. The original device and one verified master image stay sealed in storage. If a working copy is damaged, you make another from the master. Each copy gets its own ID and hash, and appears in the log.

A tamper-evident digital log

A paper log can be altered by writing over it, and a plain text file can be edited by anyone. A cleverer idea is a hash chain: each new entry includes the hash of the previous entry. Changing an old entry changes its hash, which no longer matches what the next entry recorded, so the tampering shows. This is the same principle that blockchains use, and it is a good illustration of how integrity checks work. The log below is a teaching model, not a legal substitute for signed forms.

Python Build a hash-chained custody log

Press Run (or Ctrl + Enter) to see the result here.

Program input ยท what you'd type while the program runs

Type the answers before you press Run, one per line. Each time the program reads a line (with input()), it gets the next line from this box.

Now check the chain, then tamper with an old entry to see the check fail.

Python Detect tampering in the chain

Press Run (or Ctrl + Enter) to see the result here.

Program input ยท what you'd type while the program runs

Type the answers before you press Run, one per line. Each time the program reads a line (with input()), it gets the next line from this box.

The edit to entry 1 changes its content, so its stored hash no longer matches. An attacker could recompute that hash, but then entry 2's prev field would no longer match, so they would have to rewrite every later entry too. Storing the latest hash somewhere else (a signed email, a printout in a safe) closes that gap.

Common chain-of-custody mistakes

  • Leaving evidence unattended in a car or an unlocked office.
  • Logging a transfer later from memory, or leaving the receiver's signature off.
  • Mixing items from different cases in one bag.
  • Opening a seal without recording it and re-sealing with a new numbered seal.
  • Plugging a seized USB stick into your normal computer "just to see".

If a mistake happens, document it honestly. A recorded error with an explanation is far better than a hidden one.

Check your understanding

Quick check ยท 4 questions

of 4 answered You scored / 4 ยท perfect!

  1. 1. What is the main purpose of a chain of custody?

    The chain of custody is the unbroken record of handling that supports the authenticity of the evidence.
  2. 2. In a hash-chained log, why does editing an old entry become visible?

    Each entry stores the previous entry's hash, so a changed entry breaks the link to its successor.
  3. 3. What goes around a seized phone to block remote wipe commands?

    A Faraday bag blocks radio signals, so the phone cannot receive remote commands.
  4. 4. Which should you analyse?

    Originals and master images stay sealed; analysis happens on working copies verified by hash.

Summary

  • A chain of custody is the unbroken, signed record of everything that happened to an item of evidence.
  • Label, seal, photograph and store evidence securely; do not power on seized devices.
  • Work on copies; keep the original and a master image sealed.
  • A hash chain makes record tampering detectable, which shows how integrity checks work.
  • Document mistakes honestly instead of hiding them.

Next: Hashing and evidence integrity